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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.MILDRED N. CORN,VELL, ~, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. ( 
RAY H. BARTON, ) 
Defendant and Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
No. 
10557 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The parties will be referred to as in the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff for personal 
injuries received when plaintiff slipped and fell on 
a common walkway through apartments owned and 
operated by defendant, the plaintiff being a guest of 
one of the tenants. 
l 
DISPOSITION IN THE LO\VER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting with a jury. 
From a finding of no negligence and judgment for 
defendant, plaintiff appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the judgment entered 
on the verdict and an order granting plaintiff a ne\I' 
trial. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed the complaint against defendant for 
injuries received when she slipped and fell while using 
a common walkway through an apartment house com-
plex owned and operated by him, while staying at said 
apartment as a guest of her mother, on the 5th day 
of February, 1964'. Plaintiff's mother was living in an 
apartment at the address of 2014 View Street. (See 
Exhibit 2-P). In order to proceed from this apartment 
to 21st South Street, a person would walk from 20H 
due south on a walkway between two triplexes being 
numbered 1321, 1323, and 1325 on the west and 1331, 
1333, and 1335 on the east. (Exhibit 2-P). Plaintiff 
slipped and fell on the walkway opposite 1335 as shown 
by a mark made by plaintiff on Exhibit 2-P (R. 107). 
Plaintiff testified that between 12 :30 and I :00 
P.l\I. she left the apartment of her mother and pro-
ceeded south on the walkway. At that time there was a 
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light covering of snow over the entire walkway. Plain-
tiff did not feel that there was enough snow to warrant 
orershoes. The temperature was freezing. (R. 89). 
Plaintiff did not observe any footprints on the walk-
way, she being apparently the first person to walk on 
said walkway following the snowfall. (R. 90). Plain-
tiff testified that she arose between 8 :00 and 9 :00 A.M. 
that morning; that the weather conditions outside were 
called to her attention by a telephone call from her 
brother-in-law, Pierce Brady, and that she observed 
that there was a medium snowfall occurring. She made 
the observation of the snowfall shortly after arising. 
( R. 88). Plaintiff further testified that she left the 
apartment of her mother shortly after lunch. She noticed 
while they were eating lunch that the sun had come 
out, and she decided to leave for her shopping expedi-
tion to Sugar House. (R. 88). Plaintiff proceeded out 
of the apartment, down the steps, and south along the 
walkway to the place in question. She was wearing 
walking shoes. ( R. 89). At the point in question her 
feet suddenly went out from under her, and she fell 
onto her back and head. ( R. 90) . After the fall, plain-
tiff observed that she had slipped on a sheet of ice 
which was concealed by the thin covering of snow. She 
described the ice as being V-shaped and going across 
the sidewalk from east to west; that it tapered off a 
bit toward the west; that it was approximately 2 feet 
at its widest part and tapered smaller going west. (R. 
!ll ) . Plaintiff had not noticed any ice in this vicinity 
prior to the fall. (R. 105). 
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Mrs. Florence Davis testified for defendant. She 
and her husband were the caretakers for Dr. Barton. 
She testified that she was called to the scene after Mrs. 
Cornwell had fallen, and that she observed the spot 
where she fell. She described the ice at this place as 
having the shape of an oval, about 2 feet long. (R. 
162). She testified that she had been in the area the 
day before and had observed that the walks were dry 
and clear. (R. 163). She testified that she and her 
husband had the responsibility of keeping the walks 
free of ice and snow and had been furnished with 
shovels, cement broom, and rock salt; that it had been 
their practice to scrape ice and to use salt to keep them 
free of ice. (R. 161-163). Mrs. Davis testified that on 
the day in question she had been away from the apart· 
ments from approximately 9:30 A.M. to somewhere 
between 11 :30 and noon; that the walks were dry when 
she left and when she came home there had been a light 
snowfall; that after arriving home she fixed lunch for 
herself and her daughter; that they had lunch; and 
that she then received a telephone call just after she 
had started sweeping the snow. She testified that the 
time was between l :00 and l :30 P.M. (R. 160-162). 
On cross examination Mrs. Davis admitted that 
she did not actually proceed down the walk in question 
but had walked past the area to the north on her way 
to the garbage cans the day before, during the fore· 
noon and the afternoon, and that she had not observed 
any ice on the walks; but if she had, she would have put 
salt on said places. (R. 164). l\Irs. Davis further testi· 
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lied that she and .l\Ir. Davis had two grown daughters 
Jjyiug at home who helped with the duties of maintain-
ing the walks; that a 24-year-old daughter was at home 
during the morning in question. (R. 165). She further 
testified that they \Vere careful to observe occasions 
when there was melting and freezing occurring with 
resulting patches of ice on the walks, and that when 
ice appeared, they would use rock salt. Mrs. Davis 
testified that she observed the skid marks of Mrs. Corn-
well' s heels and that she then swept off the snow in that 
area and placed salt on the ice. (R. 167). 
lHr. Davis testified that he performed the services 
of a eustodian for Dr. Harton for a consideration, (R. 
153) and that Dr. Harton had furnished him with the 
necessary equipment to perform these services, includ-
ing snow shovels and rock salt; that whenever it would 
snow, he or one of the members of his family would 
go out and shovel the snow or sweep the walks; that 
whenever the temperature would warm up so as to cause 
snow to melt and then freeze into patches of ice on the 
walks, they would take rock salt and sprinkle the same 
on the ice. He testified that he recognized ice on the 
walks would constitute a hazard to the tenants. Mr. 
Davis testified that salt was not placed on the walks 
the day before the accident; that if he had seen a patch 
of ice the day before, salt would have been used. (R. 
154-155). 1\ilr. Davis testified that there were elderly 
people and particularly elderly ladies living in the 
apartment house complex, particularly .1\Irs. Uuck, .1\Irs. 
DaYidson at 20U, an elderly lady at 1337, Mrs. 'Vatson 
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on the top of the east of the sixplex, Mrs. Yates at 
the top of 2014, and Mrs. Cornwell's mother at 2014. 
(R. 155-157). 
The records from the United States ';\T eather 
Bureau show that there was one inch of snow on the 
ground on February 3 and 4, 1964, and that inter-
mittent snow or light snow flurries began on February 
5, 1964, at 8 :32 A.M. and continued intermittently 
until 12 :05 P.l\'1.; that a snow depth of 2 inches of 
snow was on the ground at 5 :00 P.M. February 5, 
1964; that temperatures were above freezing for about 
one and one half hours on February 4, 1964; and that 
temperatures were belmv freezing all of February 5, 
1964. (Exhibit 4-P). 
The hourly temperature readings on Exhibit 8-P ~ 
for February 3, 1964, show temperatures for the entire 
24-hour period of below freezing, ranging from a low , 
of 10 to a high of 28. Exhibit 7-P for I~-.ebruary 4, 
1964, shows temperatures ranging from a low of 12 
to a high of 34. The exhibit shows a reading of 34 °F. ' 
recorded at 1 :55 P.M. on February 4, 1964; that an-
other reading of 34 °F. was recorded at 2 :56 P.M.; 
and that the readings of 12:55 P.M. and 3:55 P.M. 
were both 31°F. Exhibit 4-P shows a maximum tem-
perature reached on February 4, 1964, at 2 :15 P.M. 
of 36.4 °F. The above shows that for the period of time 
from at least 1 :55 P.M. to 2 :56 P.M. on the 4th day 
of February, 1964, the temperatures were above freei-
ing and that these were the only above-freez;ing tem-
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peratures recorded for the entire period of time from 
February 3, 1964, past the time of the accident Oil 
February 5, 1964. Exhibit 6-P showed temperatures 
for l'-.ebruary 5, rangipg from a low of 17 to a high 
of 30, the high of 30°F. being recorded at 1:55 P.M., 
which was after the occurrence of the accident in ques-
tion. 
The recordings on all of the weather records dis-
cussed aforesaid were made at the Salt Lake City Air-
port. The conclusion from the weather records is in-
escapable that the patch of ice in question was in 
existence for a minimum time of from 3 :55 P .M. on 
the day prior to the accident to and including the time 
of the accident, or close to 24 hours. 
The evidence showed that plaintiff suffered in-
juries necessitating a total of $1,212.96, (Exhibit 1-P) 
in medical expenses, occasioned by a nerve root irri-
tation consistent with a disc syndrome involving nerve 
roots at the 4th or 5th lumbar interspaces. (R. 115-
144). 
The case was submitted to the jury on special in-
terrogatories given as instruction No. 28 (R. 62). The 
jury answered the first interrogatory: 
"'Vas the defendant guilty of negligence? 
"Answer: No." 
As a result of this answer, the jury was not re-
(p tired to answer any of the additional interrogatories, 
and the court entered judgment thereon in favor of 
7 
defendant and against plaintiff, "No Cause of Action." 
(R. 67-68). 
Plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial (R. 65) 
which was denied on January 10, 1966. (R. 66). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 CONSTITUTED A 
DIRECTED VERDICT AND VIOLATED THE 
RULE THAT A FORMULA INSTRUCTION 
MUST CONTAIN THE THEORIES OF ALL 
PARTIES. 
Instruction No. 9 reads as follows: 
"If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that water or moisture had accumulated 
on the walkway because of melting snow or other · 
natural conditions which became frozen into ice, 
and that its presence was not revealed because 
of newly fallen snow; and, if you believe that 1 
these conditions were the result of natural sea· 
sonal weather conditions, such accumulation or 
presence of ice would not constitute negligence 
on the part of defendant or his agents." ( R. 43). 
Instruction No. 9 was Defendant's Requested In· 
struction No. 5. (R. 20). 
Defendant requested Instruction No. 5 (a) (R. 
33) to be given only in the event the court did not give 
Request No. 5, as follows: 
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"If you find from a preponderance of the evi-
dence that ice and snow had accumulated on the 
walkway as the result of natural seasonal con-
ditions, and the defendant or his agents did not 
in the exercise of reasonable care have a reason-
able opportunity to remove the snow prior to the 
time plaintiff fell and to discover the icy spot, 
the defendant would not be negligent." (Italics 
ours). 
The court gave Requested Instruction 5 and did 
not give Requested Instruction No. 5 (a). 
Instruction No. 9 constituted a directed verdict 
because admittedly the ice and snow in question were 
the result of natural seasonal weather conditions. 
Plaintiff's theory was that the defendant was neg-
ligent in failing to discover and remedy the ice condi-
tion. Yet the court told the jury in Instruction No. 9 
that if the ice resulted from natural seasonal weather 
conditions, its presence would not constitute negligence 
011 the part of defendant. The very thing that plaintiff 
is complaining about is the unnecessary presence of the 
ice at the time of the fall. Its presence, whether the same 
could and should have been removed or not, is said by 
the court to not constitute negligence. This instruction 
eliminates entirely any duty whatsoever to inspect, 
discover, and remove accumulations of ice, regardless 
of how long and how notoriou.y the existence of same. 
This simply cannot be the law. It negates the entire 
common law concept of duty to exercise ordinary care 
to discover and remove hazardous conditions that may 
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cause lllJury to invitees and tenants on a landlord', 
premises. 'Vlrnt the trial court has done to the Restate. 
ment and to Harper and James by this instruction 
is somewhat shocking to say the least. The court doesn'! 
say, "unless defendant had a reasonable opportunit) 
to discover the ice and failed to exercise ordinary care 
to discover and remove same, in which event he would 
be negligent." 1'he court simply states that this de-
fend ant is not negligent if the ice accumulated as a 
result of natu,,re's act, no matter how long it had re· 
mained and how clear the opportunity to remove same. 
Instruction No. 9 is objectionable for the addi· 
tional reason that it is a "formula" instruction which 
fails to include the theory of plaintiff that defenda11t 
failed to exercise ordinary care to discover and remedy 
the dangerous condition. It should be obvious from n 
mere reading of the instruction that it is prejudicial 
error, inasmuch as it tells the jury if the condition of 
the ice was the result of natural seasonal weather con· 
ditions, defendant is not negligent, without calling to 
the jury's attention the fact that defendant has an 
affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to make 
common walkways safe. This type of an error was 
contained in an instruction given by the trial court in 
the case of lvlf v. Richardson, ( 1959) 9 Utah 2d 5. 
336 P.2d 781. This case dealt with a personal injury 
received by plaintiff from being hit by a car backing 
out of a driveway. The instruction in question in the 
Ivy case was : 
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"If you find from a preponderance of the 
e\'i~leu~e that the defendant failed to keep and 
mamtam a proper lookout for the plaintiff in the 
driveway where the accident occurred and that 
such failure proximately resulted in the accident, 
then your verdict must be in favor of the plain-
tiff and against the defendant." 
Coucerning this instruction, the court stated at page 
786: 
"The above instruction, taken by itself, is in 
error because it fails to take into account the 
possible contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff. This kind of instruction, sometimes referred 
to as a 'formula instruction,' which makes a re-
cital iu accordance with the contention of a party 
and ends with the conclusion: ' * * * and if you 
so find, then your verdict must be for (the 
party) ', is not generally a good type of instruc-
tion to give. This is so because it lends itself to 
the error just noted and also because it tends to 
be argumentative rather than to set out the prin-
ciples of law applicable to the issues impartially 
as to both parties. For such reasons it is better 
to avoid giving instructions of that type. It is 
conceded that the issue of contributory negli-
gence was propertly covered in the next instruc-
tion. This, however, pitted one instruction 
against the other and might have been confusing 
to the jury." 
The Iv;1J case follo-..vs the well-recognized general rule 
(Jf law as stated at 88 C.J.S., page 927, par. 351: 
"The giving of an instruction directing a ver-
dict if the .i ury should find specified facts are 
established is not error and is not improper as 
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directing a verdict. However, an instruction 
directing a verdict if the jury should find speci 
fied facts are established,. must include all th1 
circumstances which must concur to warrant th1 
verdict and the failure to include all of the111 
is not cured by giving other instructions." (Italic~ 
ours). 
A further statement covering this type of an instruc· 
tion is contained at 89 C.J.S., TRIAL, Section 441, 
at page 37: 
"Where an instruction purports to sum up all 
the facts, the proof of which will warrant a ver· 
diet for a party, the instruction must be correct, 
and, if erroneous or incomplete, it is not sus· 
ceptible of cure by any other instructions, unless 
such instruction properly refers to, and incor· 
porates within its terms, other given instructions 
which properly submit such omitted elements. 
A binding, mandatory, or peremptory instruc· 
tion, or one directing a verdict, if erroneous or 
incomplete, cannot be cured by any other in· 
structions.'' 
This rule is further elaborated on at 53 Am. J ur., 
TRIAL, par. 518, at page 459: 
"A judge, who may not indicate an opinion 
at any stage of the trial on an issuable fact, 
may not participate in the verdict by so declar· 
ing the law as to ignore or minimize legitimate 
contentions of fact of one party to the advan· 
tage of the other. Thus, an instruction whi~h 
directs a jury to find for the plaintiff on certam 
facts stated therein is erroneous if it does not 
refer to facts that tend to show an affirmative 
defense." 
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Also see 1lloore v. Turner, 137 W. Va., 299, 71 
S.E.2d 342, 32 A.L.R.2d 713; and Hustad v. Inter-
national Oil Company, 52 Md. 343, 202 N.W. 814. 
Defendant's Requested Instruction No. 5 (a) 
shows that counsel for defendant realized the require-
ment of balancing instructions; however, the trial court 
failed to take note of this principle and gave the original 
request. Of course, plaintiff's theory was that the 
defendant was negligent in failing to discover and 
remedy a dangerous condition. The questioned instruc-
tion tells the jury that if they find that the condition 
was the result of natural seasonal accumulations of 
ice and snow, that defendant is not negligent. The 
jury in answering the first question had to follow the 
mandate given them in Instruction No. 9. 
The error contained in Instruction No. 9 cannot be 
cured by other instructions. The case of Konold v. The 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, 21 Utah 379, 
60 P. 1021, states: 
"Instructions on a material point in the case 
which are inconsistent or contradictory, should 
not be given. The giving of such instructions is 
error, and a sufficient ground of reversal because 
it is impossible aft.er verdict to ascertain which 
instruction the jury followed, or what influence 
the erroneous instruction had in their delibera-
tion. This has been so uniformly held that cita-
tions are unnecessary." 
The error committed by Instruction No. 9 is com-
ponnded by Instruction No. 11, reading as follows: 
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"The defendant, as the owner of the premis''' 
was 110t a guarantor against the occurrence oi 
the accident in which the plaintiff sustained 
injury. If you find from the evidence that the 
defendant or his employees were unaware of the 
slippery condition which caused plaintiff to fa!L 
and under the circumstances could not liave rea-
souably anticipated the existence of said con-
dition, then you must find the defendant was not 
negligent.'' 
The vice of this instruction is emphasized when 
it is realized that the instruction is coupled with the 
introductory phrase that the defendant is not a guar-
antor against the occurrence of accidents and then goes 
on to state that if the defendant or his employees were 
unaware of the slippery condition, and under the cir-
l'.Ulllstances could not have reasonably anticipated its 
existence, the defendant was not negligent. 
'l'he evidence shows that a person would have to 
anticipate the formation of ice on a sidewalk during 
a period of time when there existed temperatures for 
a time above freezing, follmved by temperatures there-
after which were subfreezing. A person must kno11 
that when temperatures are above freezing, sno-w and 
ice melt; and whe1~ temperatures are subfreezing, water 
freezes. This instruction accentuates the error con· 
tained in Instruction No. 9 and is extremely prejudiciaL 
inasmuch as it is slanted toward the defendant's theory 
and contains no balancing phrase showing the theon· 
of the plaintiff, that the defendant as an apartment 
house owner has a duty of exercising reasonable care 
14 
tu discover and correet dangerous conditions on common 
walkways. 
POINT II 
'l'lIE SUH.MISSION OF UN A VOIDABLE 
ACCIDENT IN INSTRUCTION NO. 5 CON-
STITUTED PREJUDICIAL ERR 0 R TO 
PLAINTIFF. 
Instruction No. 5 states as follows: 
"The law recognizes unavoidable accidents. 
An unavoidable accident is one which occurs in 
such a manner that it cannot justly be said to 
have been proximately caused by negligence as 
those terms are herein defined. In the event a 
party is damaged by an unavoidable accident, 
he has no right to recover, since the law requires 
that a person be injured by the fault or negli-
gence of another as a prerequisite to any right 
to recover damages." (R. 39). 
If defendant claims that unavoidable accident is 
a separate and affirmative defense, then certainly it 
shoulcl have been pleaded. Defendant made no such 
plea. The recent modern trend of authorities in this 
country has labeled unavoidable accident as an im-
material issue ancl prejudicial to plaintiffs. The reason 
for this has been that courts have realized the simple 
trnth, that mrnvoidable accident is giving defendant 
an additional defense of nonnegligence to which he is 
11ot entitled. In the other instructions the court has 
e\plained to the jury the duty of the defendant toward 
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the plaintiff, and that if plaintiff fails to prove a rio. 
lation of the duty proximately caused her injurie), 
then plaintiff cannot recover. It is prejudicial for tht 
court tu give defendant another arrow to his bow b! 
instructing the jury on unavoidable accident as a sepa 
rate defense. There is no such separate affirmatin 
defense recognized by the general tort law. 
In 1958 California repudiated a line of prior 
authority and clearly and definitely held that an instruc· 
tion on unavoidable accident is error. This was done in 
the case of Butigan v. Yellow Cab Company, 49 Cal 
2d 652, 320 P.2d 500, 65 A.L.R.2d 1. This case in· 
volved a collision between the Yellow Cab and an auto· 
mobile driven by the other defendant, when the cao 
going north attempted to turn, according to the cal1 
driver, into a driveway of the other side of the street 
in order to turn around and proceed north. The cah 
driver claimed that as he was attempting to make thi.1 
turn, his engine killed, and he became stalled and wa1 
then hit by the southbound automobile driven by the 
other defendant. The other defendant claimed that the 
cab suddenly came into his lane without any stopping 
or stalling. The court held that an instruction on mi: 
avoidable accident was reversible error. In so doing, 
the court discussed the history of the concept of unavoid· 
able accident. The court stated at page 504: 
"In reality, the so-called defense of unavoi<l· 
able accident has no legitimate place in our plead· 
ing. It appears to be an obsolete remnant froni 
a time when damages for injuries to person or 
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property directly caused by a voluntary act of 
the defendant could be recovered in an action 
of trespass and when strict liability would be 
imposed unless the defendant proved that the 
injury was caused through 'inevitable accident.' 
Although exactly what was covered by this ex-
pression is not clear, it apparently included cases 
where the d~fendant was utterly without fault. 
'Unavoidable accident' was then an affirmative 
defense to be pleaded and proved by the de-
fendant. (See 2 Harper & James, The Law of 
Torts-1956, 7,Ji7 et seq.; Prosser on Torts-2d 
Ed. 1955, 118). 
"In the modern negligence action the plaintiff 
must prove that the injury complained of was 
proximately caused by the defendant's negli-
gence, and the defendant under a general denial 
may show any circumstance which militates 
against his negJ!gence or its causal effect. The 
so-called defense of inevitable accident is nothing 
more than a denial by the defendant of negli-
gence, or a contention that his negligence, if 
any, was not the proximate cause of the injury 
* * * . The statement in the quoted instruction 
on 'unavoidable or inevitable accident' that these 
terms 'simply denote an accident that occurred 
without having been proximately caused by 
negligence' informs the jury that the question 
of unavoidability or inevitability of an accident 
arises only where the plaintiff fails to sustain 
his burden of proving that the defendant's neg-
ligence caused the accident. Since the ordinary 
instructions on negligence and proximate cause 
sufficiently show that the plaintiff must sustain 
his burden of proof on these issues in order to 
recover, the instruction on unavoidable accident 
serves no useful purpose. * * * 
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"The instruction is not only unnecessary, hul 
it is also confusing. 'Vhen the jurors are tolil 
'in law we recognize what is termed an unavoid. 
able or inevitable accident' they may get the 
impression that unavoidability is an issue to bt 
decided and that, if proved, it constitutes a sepa· 
rate ground of nonliability of the defendant. 
Thus they may be misled as to the proper manner 
of determining liability, that is, solely on the 
basis of negligence and proximate causation. 
The rules concerning negligence and proximate 
causation which must be explained to the jury 
are in t~1emselves complicated and difficult to 
understand. The further complication resulting 
from the unnecessary concept of unavoidability 
or inevitability and its problematic relation to 
negligence and proximate cause can lead only 
to misunderstanding." 
The court went on to hold that the giving of the 
instruction was prejudicial. 
Following the rationale of the Butigan case, the 
Oregon Supreme Court in 1964 held that the giYing 
of an unavoidable accident instruction is error in the 
State of Oregon. See Fenton v. Aleshire, 238 Or. 2J, 
393 P.2d 217. This case involved what is commonly 
referred to as a "darting out" case, where an 8-year· 
old girl was hit by an automobile and killed. The Oregon 
Supreme Court states in part, at page 222: 
"In the modern law of negligence the doctrine 
of 'unavoidable accident,' or, as it is sometimei 
called, 'inevitable' or 'pure' accident, is a? 
anomaly. By definition--at least by the defim· 
tion adopted by this court-it has no place a) 
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a separate ~~ud irnlependent element in an action 
based on negligence. As pointed out by Paul 
G. Rees, Jr., of the Ariwna llar, in a scholarly 
article entitled 'Unavoidable Accident-a l\li~­
understood Concept,' 'the Restatement of Torts 
does not treat unavoidable accident as an entitv 
of the law,' 5 Ariz. Law Rev. 225, footnote Ii, 
at 228. No instruction on unavoidable accident 
is included in the Uniform Jury Instructions 
in negligence cases drafted by the Committee on 
Procedure and Practice of the Oregon State 
Bar, and approYed by the judges of the Circuit 
Court of l\Iultnomah County on February 21, 
190:3. As this court has repe~tedly declared, an 
unaYoidable accident is nothing more nor less 
than an accident which occurs without anyone's 
fault. In practical effect, when included in the 
charge of the court to th~ jury, it is lagniappe 
to the defendant-not only because it is an 
added 'you-should-find-for-the-defendant' type 
of instruction, but because it may be misunder-
stood by the jury as constituting some sort of 
separate defense. By its very nature it has led 
this court-and we apprehend other courts-to 
regard the 1;ef us al to give the instruction as no 
ground for reYersal, to attempt to delimit the 
type of cases to which it is applicable, to declare 
that eYen in those cases it is discretionary with 
the trial judge and to admonish caution in the 
use of the instruction. "rha t is to guide the 
<liscretion of the judge in a particular case is 
by no means clear." 
The eourt then refers to the Butiyan case and states as 
follows on page 22:3: 
"This reasoning is in full accord with what 
this court has said in nu.merous decisions, and 
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makes unavoidable the conclusion that instni, 
tions on unavoidable accidents in negligen
1 
cases are without value and may be prejudicial 
Following this line of authorities, the Supretli 
Court of Colorado, in 1964, in the case of Lewis, et o! 
v. Buckskin Joe's, Inc., et al., ____ Col. ____ , 396 P.i, 
933, did away with unavoidable accident instruction· 
in the State of Colorado. This case had to do will 
personal injuries caused by the overturning of a stage 
coach which was a concession run on defendant's prop-
erty. The court, following the line of authority of tl11 
Butigan and Fenton cases, stated at page 941: 
"This instruction should not have been giren 
Instructions on negligence and contributory mg· 
ligence are sufficient and inclusive of so-callee 
unavoidable accidents. To further instruct 01 
unavoidable accident serves only to twice tel 
the jury that the plaintiff cannot recover unh 
he proves negligence. 
"Though this court has sanctioned the girin; 
of instructions on unavoidable accident and, 01: 
occasion, held it to be reversible error to refust 
to so instruct, we now determine that to gin 
such instruction or to recognize unavoidablt 
accident in an action based on negligence, as aL 
independent element, separate and apart frorn 
negligence and contributory negligence, is im-
proper." 
And again at page 942: 
"'¥ e conclude that from and after announce-
ment of this opinion an instruction on unaroi~ 
able accident should never be given; and, thoug! 
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recognizing that accidents may be unavoidable, 
now go on record holding that a plea of unavoid-
able accident may not be set up as a separate 
or independent defense and that to now instruct 
on unavoidable accident is error. 'Ve expressly 
overrule previous announcements of this court 
to the contrary." 
The clear trend of authorities toward condemna-
tion of unavoidable accident instructions in automobile 
collision cases can be seen by examing an annotation 
following the Butigm1 case at 65 A.L.R. 2d page 12. 
See also the following: C arlburg v. Wesley H ospi,tal 
and Nurse Training School, (1958), 182 Kan. 634, 
323 P.2d 638; Tyree v. Dunn, ( 1957) ____ Okl. ____ , 315 
P.2d 782; Cohen v. Kaminetsky, (1961), 36 N.J. 276, 
176 A.2d 483; Bennett v. McCready (1960), 57 Wash. 
2d 317, 356 P.2d 712; Kreh v. Trinkle (1959), 195 
Kan. 329, 343 P.2d 213; Whittaker v. Green (1948), 
191 _Md. 712, 62 A.2d 630; Leach v. Great Northern 
Railway Cornpany (1961), 139 :Mont. 84, 360 P.2d 94; 
Loser v. Sklar, ( 1959), 357 Mich. 166, 97 N.W.2d 617. 
The propensity for injecting confusion into the 
minds of the jurors by using the unavoidable accident 
instruction becomes apparent when we consider that to 
the layman, untutored in the technicalities of tort law, 
an accident is an unintended injury. Lawyers appre-
ciate that unintended injuries may be subdivided into 
two kinds : I. Unintended and nonnegligent, (for 
which in general and apart from situations to which 
strict liability attaches, there is no liability) ; and 2. 
t'nintended and negligent, (giving rise to liability for 
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the tort of negligenee) . Considered in the foregoin'. 
light, it becomes apparent that the use of the veri 
term "unavoidable accident" carries with it a very prejt; 
dicial connotation. The serious risk is that the .Jlll') 
will reason as follows: 
"The defendant didn't mean to injure tht 
plaintiff; it was only an accidental injury, witJ1. 
out design, deliberation, or intent; on this vie11 
of things, the judge has instructed us that our 
sworn duty is to find for the defense." 
In speaking of the tendency of such an instructior 
to create confusion, the court stated in Carlbur9 
v. The Wesley Hospital & Nurse Training School 
(I958), I82 Kan. 634, 323 P.2d 638, at page 641: 
"Generally speaking, when an accident J) 
caused by negligence, there is no room for appli· 
cation of the doctrine of 'unavoidable accident. 
even though the accident may have been 'ineY1t· 
able' or 'unavoidable' at the time of its occur· 
rence, and one is not entitled to the protection 
of the doctrine if his negligence has created, 
brought about, or failed to remedy a dangerom 
condition resulting in a situation where the acci· 
dent is thus 'inevitable' or 'unavoidable' at the 
time of its occurrence. In other words, a person 
is liable for the combined consequences of an 
'inevitable' or 'unavoidable' accident and his ow11 
negligence.'' 
It can well be appreciated that the unavoidable 
accident instruction is prejudicial to the plaintiff when 
this instruction is considered in combination with In· 
structions 9 and I I. Instruction No. 9 has prepared 
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the grmuHl work hy instruding the jury that defendant 
ri is uot negligent if the iee resulted from natural seasonal 
u 1reather conditions. Instruction No. 11 adds the concept 
:·1 that defendant is not a guarantor and not responsible 
if his employees did not or should not have known of 
the dangerous condition. In this context the court then 
It 
instrnds that defendant is not responsible for an un-
11· 
11 aroidable accident. It is obvious that from Instructions 
11 \land 11 the jury is directed that this was an tmaYoid-
able accident and then Instruction No. 5 instructs the 
jury that defendant is not responsible for unavoidable 
accidents. This combination of instructions most cer-
taiuly constitutes a directed verdict for the defendant. 
Xo answer other than the answer given by the jury 
eould result if the jury is to follow these instructions. 
The instruction on unavoidable accident is extra-
neous to the issues and evidence of the case at bar, 
and it was prejudicial error for the court to give it. 
See 1lloore v. Denver & Rio Grande TVestern RR. Co. 
(HJ5t>), 4 U.2d 255, 292 P.2d 849; and White v. Pinne:lJ 
(HJ40), 99 U. 484, 108 P.2d 24<9, which hold that in 
L'tah it is error to giYe instructions on extraneous issues 
nen though they may be abstractly correct. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury could not have answered the interroga-
tor\' a11v other wa v under the instructions. Instructions . . . 
Xos. !l and 11 told the jury that if the ice con-
ditio11 resulted from natural seasonal weather concli-
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tions, the defendant is not negligent; and further, tba' 
the defendant is not a guarantor against the occurrell(i 
of an accident. Instruction No. 11 further told the jur.' 
that if defendant's employees were unaware and undl~ 
the circumstances could not have reasonably anticipate1J 
the existence of the ice, defendant is not responsiblr 
In this situation the court delivered the crushing bl(J\' 
by instructing the jury that the law recognizes un· 
avoidable accidents and that plaintiff cannot recorn 
for an unavoidable accident. 
These instructions constituted a directed verdic: 
for defendant. Not only did the court deliver mandator! 
instructions purporting to cover the entire case withlllr 
including plaintiff's theory, but the court also instructeli' 
on unavoidable accident, which was an extraneou, 
matter and reversible error in and of itself. 
With slanted, prejudicial, and erroneous instrn· 
tions such as these, plaintiff did not receive a fair jun 
trial. 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgmel! 
should be reversed and the case remanded for a nev. 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, 'VALLACE, ROBERTS 
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JOHN L. BLACK 
Attorneys for Appellant 
24 
